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50 Years Later

Fifty years on from the Cuban missile crisis, the world has become an even more dangerous place than it was then. Back in 1962 there were two nuclear rivals, now there are many. What motivated the Soviet decision to seek Castro’s agreement with the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuban soil is a complex question. In truth what tempted Khrushchev to talk tough and then retreated with an apoplogy of sorts, continues to be shrouded in mystery. There was no denying the fact that the Pentagon was determined to destroy the Cuban revolution by any means as they would send out 40,000 US soldiers on a mock-invasion of an unnamed Caribbean island with the supposed aim of overthrowing a dictator codenamed Ortsac-i.e. Castro backwards. Piecing together some background events, what appears exfacie is really complex—Soviet strategic interests rather Russian national interests were more important than socialist solidarity to save Cuba.

The October crisis of 1962, as it is generally known in Cuba, did not come out of a clear blue sky. Ever since the Soviet Red Army had comprehensively defeated the Nazi war machine and led the liberation of Europe from fascist occupation, America and its European allies began to work overtime as to how to roll back the socialist camp and in the ’60s the camp included East Europe, China and Cuba as well.

In addition to its home-based nuclear arsenal, in 1958 Washington had already deployed Thor Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Britain; the deployment in 1961 of Jupiter IRBMs to Italy and Turkey further increased the threat to Moscow. And Soviet Russia by contrast, whilst able to target US allies, could not get beyond Alaska and US soil at the early stage of nuclear arms race. The strategic advantage of missiles on Cuban soil, ninety-nine miles from Miami, was self-evident. But Khrushchev faltered with no commitment to defend Cuba if there was an invasion at a later stage. And Mao who was then fighting Soviet revisionism internationally, lost no time to describe how the Soviet Party—CPSU—under Khrushchev proceeded ‘‘from adventurism to capitulationism’’.

They talked to Castro when they deployed missiles on Cuban soil, making Cuba an immediate target of the Pentagon. But they didn’t think it necessary when they decided to pack up. Castro came to know it from the media. Only the other day while marking the fiftieth anniversary of the October crisis, Castro made a self-revealing statement: ‘‘When Khrushchev proposed the installation here of medium range missiles similar to those the United States had in Turkey—far closer to the USSR than Cuba to the United States—as a solidarity necessity, Cuba did not hesitate to agree to such a risk. Our conduct was ethically irreproachable. We will never apologize to anyone for what we did. The fact is that half a century has gone, and here we still are with our heads held high’’.

Strangely, Cuba continues to get less attention from the Indian left and far left as well. They don’t think there is a lot to learn from Cuba. Despite continuous American economic blockade and threats of invasion, Cuba stands defiant still while the Soviet Union, for so long so ill-served by the successors of Khurshchev, though enduring as an unquenchable flame in the hearts of progressive humanity, sadly is no more there. [contributed]

Frontier
Vol. 45, No. 30, February 3- 9, 2013

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